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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to inform readers on the history and the performance of tying state-sponsored 
retirement plans to the market. In the late 1970’s and 1980’s, many Latin American university 
students participated in an exchange program affiliated with the University of Chicago. After 
completing their studies under notable free-market economists such as Milton Friedman and 
Arnold Harberger, these students returned home and took prominent positions in 
governments- mainly in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. In Chile, the students developed a plan 
known as el ladrillo (“the brick”). In 1981, their retirement system was completely privatized. 
Mutual funds, called Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs), were set up to collect 
Chilean worker contributions, invest the savings, and gradually pay out benefits once workers 
reached retirement age. Over the past thirty-five years, the AFPs have averaged high returns, 
and the establishment of a minimum mandatory contribution has eliminated unfunded 
government liabilities. The successes and failures of the Chilean pension system has been 
studied by both neoliberal and alter-globalist scholars alike. Over 25 countries have 
implemented market-based or mixed-source state retirement plans since Chile’s experiment in 
1981. Recently, Chile has experienced difficulties with its retirement system, as large rates of 
noncompliance have reduced contributions into the AFPs. After analyzing the problem from a 
socioeconomic lens, I have concluded that the private retirement system is sustainable in Chile, 
albeit with modest reforms. Furthermore, pension privatization can and has been replicated in 
other nations; with moderate financial cost that was largely achieved through the privatization 
of public firms in CEE countries. In historically capitalist countries with relatively small amounts 
of publicly-held firms (U.S. and Europe), a large source of capital isn’t always readily available. 
Through modest budgetary reform, though, privatization should be examined in the Global 
North as policymakers attempt to address future Social Security deficits. 
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 The Studebaker Corporation, after years of strong sales, entered lean times during the 
Great Depression. Studebaker family chauffeurs, including my great-grandfather Wilhelm 
Zachman, were fortunate enough to regain their jobs in 1935 as the company reemerged from 
receivership. Declining profitability and financial difficulties finally caught up to Studebaker, 
though, and the company went bankrupt in 1963. Besides the loss of an iconic manufacturer, 
government auditors uncovered a massive fraud- money hadn’t been set aside by Studebaker 
to cover worker pensions, as stipulated by prior contracts with the UAW. Pension liabilities 
totaling $15,000,000 --about $116,000,000 in 2015 dollars--wouldn’t be paid out to 
beneficiaries (Lowenstein, 2005). The Federal Government stepped in to fix the problem, and 
sought to design a more permanent solution to prevent another system collapse from 
happening again. On Labor Day 1974, President Gerald R. Ford signed the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act into law. Among other provisions, which included the establishment of the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, the Act provided for the implementation of the 
Individual Retirement Account.1 As time went on, the IRA has become quite popular, as 
companies recognized defined contribution plans as advantageous to meeting future 
obligations. In the United States, market-based retirement plans have been used to supplement 
Social Security payouts to retirees. Other countries, though, were earlier adopters of market-
based retirement plans, taking the first step to tie their entire Social Security systems (and not 
just individual accounts) to the economy and its performance. In 1981, under then-Secretary of 
Labor and Social Security Jose Pinera, Chile took this first step in dismantling the crutch of the 
                                                 
1 The following paper refers to OA (Old-Age) Insurance as “Social Security”, and not the SD (Survivor and Disability 
Benefits) component. Survivors Benefits and Disabled Insurance are provided through an administrative fee 
charged to AFP contributors in Chile, and has historically hovered around 3%. Only OA insurance will be discussed 
in the following paper. 
post-war welfare state.2 Private sector mutual funds called AFPs were set up to collect worker 
contributions and invest them in domestic stock securities.3 From the mid-1980s until the late 
1990s, Chile’s economy grew at a spectacular rate of 7.2%, leading to high returns for retirees 
who have AFP accounts (Edwards & NBER, 2000). The “Chilean Miracle” has served as a model 
for governments ranging from Poland to Mexico to experiment in setting up IRAs for their 
workers, with varying degrees of success. Recently though, Chile has experienced difficulties 
with its retirement system, as large rates of noncompliance have reduced contributions into the 
AFPs. This problem has been amplified by low economic growth, which averaged 4.1% between 
2001 and 2013. With structural reforms to both the economy and the Chilean Social Security 
system, the integrity of the system can remain intact. Furthermore, it can also serve as a model 
for retirement reform in developed countries, like the United States- as policymakers begin to 
address future Social Security deficits. 
 After the 1871 defeat of the French in the Franco-Prussian War, Prussian Chancellor 
Otto Von Bismarck sought to preserve unification and maintain industrial progress by providing 
a safety net for old-age workers. In Germany, social insurance programs were introduced 
mainly to strengthen the conservative hold on power (Scambler, 2005). This helped to slow the 
rise of the liberals and socialists, whom many believed to be responsible for the 1848 European 
Revolutions and the destruction brought on by the 1871 Paris Commune. In the early 20th 
                                                 
2 Great Britain and United States greatly increased the size of their respective social safety nets following World 
War II (Truman’s Fair Deal, followed by Johnson’s Great Society). In the U.S., this included Medicaid, Medicare, 
Social Security, unemployment benefits, etc. In Europe, this model also included universal healthcare. Early on, 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s administration focused on industrial inefficiency and labor relations, and not 
entitlement reform. The Chilean AFPs were the first direct attempt to break apart the Keynesian-based, post-war 
entitlement scheme.  
3 this requirement was later liberalized 
century, though, Social Security became less about nationalization. Instead, it was made to be 
an important building block for the modern “welfare state”. Through modest transfer 
payments, industrialized nations sought to reduce elderly poverty rates and raise standards of 
living. Upon signing the 1935 Social Security Act, which established the system still in place 
today, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt maintained that “There is no tragedy in growing old, 
but there is tragedy in growing old without means of support” (Office of the Historian, President 
Roosevelt). The system was designed to cover the void in the nation’s post-work social 
insurance system, as not every American had access to large company pension plans, such as 
the one at Studebaker Corporation. Since 1935, about 453 million Social Security numbers have 
been issued to Americans, and over $11 trillion in contributions have been paid out to 
beneficiaries (Office of the Historian, FAQs). Historically speaking, the United States Social 
Security system has led a surplus, collecting about $13 trillion to its $11 trillion total payout 
over the years (Office of the Chief Actuary). Numerous amendments, legislative “fixes”, and an 
increasingly older demographic present challenges to its future operational success.  
The U.S. Social Security system has largely been structured in the same way since its 
establishment in 1935: employers and employees both contribute a percentage of the 
employee’s taxable income to the Trust Fund. In 1935, each party was responsible for 1% in 
FICA taxes; by 2016, this figure had increased to 6.2% of taxable income, up to the taxable 
minimum of $106,800 per worker (Office of the Chief Actuary, Tax Rates). At retirement age, a 
monthly check is issued up until death. The Trust Fund is made up of a mixture of U.S. 
government short and long-term bills, which are considered the safest form of debt. Originally, 
President Roosevelt called for the Social Security to be fully funded under law. Of course, this 
isn’t how any insurance program works. Much as with traditional life insurance plans, incoming 
contributions are used to pay current beneficiaries. This system is known as pay-as-you go, or 
PAYGO. A fully-funded system wouldn’t be practical, because it would lead to an astronomical 
accumulation of reserves in the Treasury. The first Social Security Commissioner, Arthur 
Altmeyer, wanted reserve excesses to be used to buy government bonds or corporate 
securities. Possible efforts to fund government infrastructure projects or to spur investment in 
corporate capital was derided by opponents, though, with Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), 
even going as far to call the proposed scheme “socialism with a vengeance” (Altmeyer, 
Interview 2). Economist John Attarian points out, though, that the Social Security 
Administration has no direct control over the Trust Fund, as it “is a Treasury account, nothing 
more” (Attarian, 2001). It was set up as an accounting device to prevent the accumulation of a 
larger than necessary reserve in 1939, according to Altmeyer. The “Trust Fund” simply functions 
as a transfer endpoint, as worker contributions are deposited into the Treasury General Fund, 
an equal amount in Treasury securities is appropriated into the “Fund” itself. In an individual 
retirement account, though, no mixing of funds occurs, and full control over assets are retained 
by the accountholder.4 In an important legal ruling, the Supreme Court wrote that “to engraft 
upon the Social Security system a concept of "accrued property rights" would deprive it of the 
flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it demands” 
(Flemming v. Nestor, 1960). Another structural issue with Social Security is that the current 
benefit calculation creates a disincentive for older workers to remain in the workforce. Since 
older workers are more financially secure, well-established, and generally have lower amounts 
                                                 
4 This is not the case under the current  United States Social Security system 
of outstanding liabilities, the natural incentive to work longer is lessened. Social Security, 
though, takes this further - by determining post-retirement benefits on the highest 35 years of 
earnings, “so that work years beyond 35 add little or nothing to final benefits” (Reznik, Weaver, 
& Biggs, 2001). In addition, benefits received while working are taxed, adding to a dip in the 
old-age labor participation rate. Furthermore: even with administrative costs and risk 
minimization factored in, interest rates on private securities have been higher over the last 75 
years than government backed ones, evident by the historic rate of return on the stock market 
of 11% (Damodaran, 2016). The combined lack of individual property rights, old-age 
disincentive to work, and historically low interest rates on government securities makes a 
compelling argument for a shift towards a private sector-based, state-sponsored retirement 
system.  
 In his 1970 Presidential victory speech, Salvador Allende rallied his Popular Unity (UP) 
supporters around a call to “end the power of imperialism in Chile” through the nationalization 
of both copper production and foreign capital (UPI, p. 1). Between 1971 and 1972, Allende’s 
administration made large investments in infrastructure designed to improve the country’s 
human capital- which included facilities that supported primary education, healthcare, and land 
reform. Historically speaking, land reforms in other countries5 have been successful in reducing 
unemployment, increasing aggregate demand, and raising government tax revenues. Increased 
demand, though, was not met by an increased supply of goods and services. This was because 
of President Allende’s hostility to free enterprise, according to then-U.S. Ambassador to the 
U.N. George H.W. Bush (Harmer, 195). Allende’s reforms failed to spark a jump in overall 
                                                 
5 South Korea and India 
productivity, though. Instead, aggregate supply decreased, and price controls and consumer 
subsidies were instituted to hide inflationary pressures (over 500% by 1973) in the closed-off 
Chilean economy (Inflation). The prices of household goods in the Chilean market rose 
drastically, and to balance the increasing government deficit and maintain an increasing rate of 
growth, the UP government devalued the Chilean escudo by almost 10% monthly. The fall in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and a shortage of foreign exchange (fx) reserves used by the 
Finance Ministry to fund large-scale nationalization programs led to the eventual collapse of 
Chile’s capital system. On September 11th, 1973, Chile's military executed a bloody coup, which 
removed Allende from power and eventually instilled General Augusto Pinochet as the 
country’s leader. The junta had “succeeded in its basic goal, getting rid of Allende” (Time 46), 
but the economy was thrown into further depression. The time between 1973 and 1975 was 
devoid of any cohesive economic policy, and marked the beginning of the numerous human 
rights abuses perpetrated by Pinochet’s regime. In 1975, with the country at yet another 
turning point, General Pinochet began to quickly adopt the policies of free-market economists; 
most notably, Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger. The distinguished professors and their 
University of Chicago students, advocated for a “shock doctrine” - the aptly-named title of 
activist Naomi Klein’s 2007 book that critiqued neoliberal policies and institutions in developing 
countries. The policy changes included sharp cuts in money creation, taxes, government 
spending, and the privatization of publicly-held firms. Investments in health and childcare 
infrastructure were slashed- as according to Harvard-trained political economist Dani Rodrik 
(2008), “Economic growth is the most powerful instrument for reducing poverty” (p. 2). It took 
until the mid-1980s for the newly-structured Chilean economy to take off, and it has been the 
fastest-growing economy in Latin America from the late 20th century onwards. Upon closer 
examination, it is safe to conclude that the economic growth Chile experienced in the late 20th 
century was largely responsible for the high returns of the Chilean AFPs. 
After leaving office, Jose Pinera commented that “the transformation of those unfunded 
systems into systems in which wealth is accumulated in individual accounts can bring about a 
new paradigm, a world of worker-capitalist[s]” (Pinera, 2001). He, along with other policy 
officials in the Pinochet regime, concluded that the high rates of inflation and noncompliance 
hindered the existing unfunded system’s ability to pay benefits out to future retirees. By using 
Rostow’s economic stages of growth model, it is safe to say that at this time, the United States 
was in the final stage of high mass consumption. Using the same framework, Chile and other 
Latin American countries6 were undergoing the conditions deemed necessary as pre-conditions 
to take-off. Since the median age of the population in Chile, like most of Latin America, was 
quite young (21.8 years, compared to almost 28.5 years in the United States), a shift in plan 
structure could be implemented without significant disruption to beneficiaries. In order to 
minimize the potential for disruption, the Chilean government allowed current beneficiaries 
and people who planned on retiring within 5 years to remain on the unfunded system, slowly 
winding down its operations. After 1981, all workers entering the workforce had to enroll in 
one of the AFPs, and begin the mandatory minimum wage contribution of 10%. Current 
workforce participants (in 1981) were given the option to switch over to the AFPs, and were 
given an 18% gross wage increase by the government for doing so. This pay bump reflects the 
higher mandatory minimum contribution borne solely by the employee, as the employer no 
                                                 
6 Who would later privatize their pension systems after years of military rule 
longer paid any old-age tax. In addition, these workers also received a security from the federal 
government signifying the amount of their past contributions to the old system. This 
“recognition bond” was also automatically marked to inflation- which is interesting, considering 
the political battle going on today concerning Social Security COLAs (cost of living allowances) in 
the United States. Once eligible workers reach retirement age (65 for men, 60 for women), they 
have either two options: purchase an annuity, or make programmed withdrawals from their 
individual account. Of course, annuities have been made more attractive by the lack of an 
administrative fee and by strong economic performance (Callund, 2010, p. 46).  
In the Shock Doctrine, activist Naomi Klein claimed that large corporations and the 
Pinochet regime “joined forces to wage an all-out war on the third power sector- the workers- 
thereby drastically increasing the alliance’s share of the national wealth” (Klein, 2007, p. 105). 
During the peak of Pinochet’s power in the 1980s, though, this simply wasn’t the case. Despite 
a plunge in copper prices in the 1980s--along with a severe economic recession in 1982--Chile 
rebounded quicker than neighboring countries dependent on primary sector exports. This was 
in large part due to its higher total factor productivity and prior reductions in government 
expenditures. Chilean workers were spared massive layoffs and a prolonged high 
unemployment rate, as the government had shifted much of the copper burden from state-
owned Codelco to foreign firms (despite retaining a majority share). Today, Venezuela and 
Brazil are experiencing sharp economic downturns and shortages as a result of their 
overdependence on another natural resource, oil, for large subsidy programs (Vyas 2015) 
(Jelmayer 2005). As Chile lowered their exposure to copper price volatility, and limited industry 
was introduced in the economy, the AFP rules on portfolio risk were loosened. In 1990, AFPs 
were allowed to invest in foreign securities. This small limit was increased gradually to 45% by 
2008. The goal of these measures, according to Social Security Administration researcher 
Barbara E. Kritzer, was to “allow the AFPs to diversify their portfolios and gradually reduce the 
concentration in domestic instruments to lessen the impact on the domestic financial market.” 
(Kritzer SSA) Other instruments that AFPs were later allowed to invest in included: bank 
deposits, corporate bonds, foreign banks, and asset-backed securities- such as mortgage bonds. 
It is hard to tell if the liberalization of AFP portfolio requirements has led to higher returns or 
not- there are too many macroeconomic indicators to consider, given a certain time frame.7 It is 
safe to say, though, that performance has been stable relative to past performance- when AFPs 
were mainly invested in domestic treasuries and very limited amounts of corporate bonds. 
Today there are six AFPs offered to workers. Each AFP offers 5 types of funds- lettered A-E 
according to riskiness (with Letter A funds being invested in equities, and Letter E funds 
consisting of mostly fixed rate instruments). According to the researchers, the funds have 
averaged a 12% nominal rate of return since the program’s inception in 1981 (Mittelstaedt & 
Olsen, 2003). Government intervention did exist early on, in order to mitigate the effects of the 
1982 foreign exchange crisis, but “most of the return in the second half of the eighties and the 
nineties has been genuine and is based on effective market returns of portfolio investments in 
Chile during the period” (Vial Ruiz-Tagle & Castro, 1997, p.12). Though returns have fallen to 
more sustainable numbers, they are still averaging around 7% in real terms, peaking above 20% 
nominally in 1982, 1983, and 1991. For comparative purposes, the United States Treasury has 
                                                 
7 Exs. inflation, performance of instruments relative to domestic conditions, fluctuations in portfolio weight given 
instrument purchases, etc.  
measured that the “average real interest rate for the 134 years [between] 1870 to 2003 is near 
3 percent” (Girola, 2005, p.2) on government-backed securities. The AFPs also function as an 
investment vehicle for the Chilean economy, much as public employee pension plans do in the 
United States (examples include FERS, CalPERS, and NYSLRS). According to AFP architect Jose 
Pinera, “the pension funds have now accumulated resources equivalent to 70 percent of gross 
domestic product [in 2004], a pool of savings that has helped finance economic growth and 
spurred the development of liquid long-term domestic capital” (Pinera, 2004, p.1). He also 
added that, through the acquisition of individual accounts, that “since they [AFP contributors] 
have a personal stake in the economy, workers cheer the stock market's surges rather than 
resent them, and know that bad economic policies will harm retirement benefits” (p. 2). 
Through AFP investment, workers attain a sense (both literally and figuratively) of ownership in 
individual companies. Between 1981 and today, the private savings rate has jumped 
significantly in Chile, increasing by 11% in the period between 1985 and 2012 (Certa et al, 
2015). Furthermore, economic growth through both foreign and domestic investment has 
grown considerably. Chile’s high growth rate accounted for spectacular economic prosperity in 
the late 20th century, relative to other Latin American countries. Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina 
were being bailed out by large IMF loans at the time, after taking on large debt loads to finance 
ambitious infrastructure programs (Bertola & Ocampo, 2012). Above-average returns in times 
of normal growth, due to the diversification and privatization of risk, present a unique 
opportunity to solve anticipated future deficits in the Global North.   
As Latin American countries faced unfunded liabilities and high inflation in their social 
insurance programs, many turned to the Chilean model for assistance. Bolivia (1997), Mexico 
(1997), and El Salvador (1998) implemented programs with mandatory private individual 
accounts; while Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru reformed their PAYGO systems along 
with introducing voluntary supplementary accounts. As a group, these reforms have been quite 
successful. Though the rate of evasion is stubbornly high (though not as high as in Chile), 
economic growth has been strong. In Europe, though, the change has been quite different. 
Most of the countries that underwent pension system changes were former communist states. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent switch to a market-based 
economy led to PAYGO systems requiring both employer and employee contributions. These 
times were marked with economic instability and hyperinflation. The standard of living 
guaranteed under communist rule had collapsed, and new governments “relaxed qualifications 
for early retirement and disability and used them as welfare and unemployment programs for 
the unemployed” (Cerda et al. 2015). By the mid-1990s, the CEE PAYGO systems were near 
total collapse. By implementing market-based mixed systems, these countries also dealt with a 
population skewed older more appropriately. The advantage of a mixed system is that older 
contributors will be guaranteed a sufficient benefit for retirement, and the system will not bear 
a high upfront cost on a country’s already overextended budget. Many of the CEE countries 
(Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and Poland) were interested in joining the European Union down the 
road, and “requirements for doing so include total explicit debt not to exceed 60 percent of the 
country's gross domestic product” (Kritzer, 2001/2002, SSA). Recognition bonds were extremely 
expensive in Chile, and only made possible through extensive privatization of publicly-owned 
enterprises. This debate was notable in Poland, where it was eventually decided that the sale of 
state enterprises through powszechne uwłaszczenie “general propertisation” would serve as 
the funding mechanism for the transition. The money through “general propertisation” would 
cover the future deficit of the current program ZUS, while the private account system would be 
fully funded by mandatory contributions. This process was repeated in other countries 
undergoing a pension shift, with varying degrees of success. Of course, the United States has a 
strong history of free enterprise and has veered away from the nationalization of large firms or 
entire industries. To undergo such a drastic shift in pension system makeup, where would the 
money come from? 
The full privatization of any Social Security system presents many challenges, each of 
which may be insurmountable for any country to overcome. First and foremost, there are 
significant costs associated with a national pension transition, which limits the plan as a 
potential fix to future pension woes. Why is this the case?  Under such transition, “not only do 
current pensions to be paid out: future pension claims of the middle-aged have to be honoured 
as well” (Gesell et al. 1998). In Poland and Chile, this was largely financed through the sale of 
state-owned enterprises to domestic investors and foreign firms. In a sense, the privatization of 
firms helped to privatize social insurance. Now, most developed countries don’t have very 
many firms still in public hands, nor would their removal from state control be particularly easy 
or lucrative. A debt issue would have to be considered in order to fully finance any transition, 
and investors would not respond favorably to any large increase in any country’s deficit, 
particularly one with no immediate impact on the economy. In order for such a system to be 
replicated in developed countries, any combination of the following must occur: a cut in current 
benefits, significantly raising/establishing a minimum contribution (10% in Chile, and higher in 
almost every other Latin American country), and/or slashing current expenditures on non-
entitlement programs from the federal budget. Notable free-market economists, including 
Chris Edwards of the Cato Institute, have long made clear that Social Security privatization 
efforts must include a sizable cut in any developed countries budget. Otherwise, a large 
transition cost would incur. Sensible spending cuts could be achieved through eliminating 
entitlement, healthcare, and defense budget excesses. In addition, revenues could be increased 
through effective tax reform- through the elimination of top-heavy deductions and an overall 
simplification of the tax code. The AFPs may be unique to Chile, and full privatization outside of 
Latin America is nearly non-existent (besides in Kazakhstan). Due to their reduced costs, mixed 
plans that consist of both a mandatory PAYGO and mandatory private account8 may be easier 
to implement. The main sticking point in private pension plans with many Americans, though, 
concerns the slow growth of portfolios in a time of poor market performance. It is true that 
those retiring in the midst of a recession would take a hit on their retirement savings, as many 
Americans did in their IRAs and 401k plans in 2008. Historically, though, market-tied securities 
have had a higher rate of return than government-backed securities! Taking a long-term 
approach to investing, with appropriate diversification in a given portfolio, means that 
significant damage can be avoided. A plan with multiple stages of risk, with different asset 
allocations in each stage (as the A-E plans have in Chile), could help to mitigate concerns. 
History has shown that prolonged times of economic growth more than make up for the 
occasional bust – evident by the high recurring annual rate of return (RARR) on market-based 
securities. It is important to note that the current Social Security system in place isn’t immune 
from poor market performance either. The weakening and tightening of the dollar by the 
                                                 
8 These plan structures are found across CEE countries and Great Britain 
Federal Reserve (or any central bank) alters the nominal value of any benefit. A common 
problem found in private national pension systems not found in public ones, though, is the rate 
of noncompliance. Sebastian Pinera (Jose Pinera’s brother), in his unsuccessful run to become 
President, noted that “Chile's social security system requires deep reforms in all sectors, 
because half of Chileans have no pension coverage, and of those who do, 40 percent are going 
to find it hard to reach the minimum level” (Rohter, 2006). Noncompliance has become a large 
problem in private systems worldwide. Since many of these countries are considered 
developing, a rather large informal sector still exists. It is known that evasion is much higher in 
Latin America than in CEE nations, but in Hungary, the size of the underground economy is as 
high as 30% of GDP. A high informal sector also contributes to gender inequality, since women 
are more likely than men to be employed informally. If people are “off the books”, they don’t 
have to contribute to the system, and thereby add to the noncompliance rate. The same logic 
also applies to the self -employed (who, in Chile, weren’t mandated to contribute until 2012) 
and those who have underreported their income to avoid paying more in contributions. A high 
noncompliance rate will be particularly troublesome in the future, when guaranteed minimum 
pensions for non-contributors come due. Government has, and should continue to, play a role 
in the development of the economy; by cracking down on underreporters, increasing 
educational opportunities, and providing for additional unemployment benefits. This would aid 
in the breakdown of the informal sector and allow for upward mobility, while also shrinking the 
gender gap. Mandating contributions, while also assisting in economic growth, are appropriate 
roles for government in a private system. 
 Former Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY), half of the bipartisan Simpson-Bowles Debt 
Commission9 assailed the AARP as “38 million people bound together by love of airline 
discounts” (Grim, 2009). As an advocate for the elderly, the AARP was instrumental in backing 
negative advertising surrounding President Bush’s unsuccessful plan to partially privatize Social 
Security in his second term. George W. Bush had a longtime interest in reforming social 
insurance programs: in 1997, Jose Pinera and Bush had dinner at the Governor’s Mansion in 
Austin, where they discussed the Chilean retirement reforms (Hook, 2005). Comparatively 
speaking, the President’s proposal was much less invasive than the AFP system was in Chile. It 
sought to divert a small portion of FICA taxes paid to private IRA-like accounts for each 
individual contributor. In its final report, the three plans that the Commission to Strengthen 
Social Security laid out called for diverting between one and four percent of FICA taxes to 
private accounts.10 While public opinion was initially receptive to reform efforts, it quickly 
soured. Baby boomers, the biggest supporters of Bush’s reelection campaign, united together 
and rebelled against any effort to cut or redistribute benefits. For many retirees, Social Security 
is their only source of income. Edward F. Coyle, Executive Director of the Alliance for Retired 
Americans, claimed that “privatizing Social Security would let Wall Street firms profit while 
gambling workers’ Social Security savings on the roulette wheel of the stock market” (Coyle, 
2012). His statement couldn’t be further from the truth. While exposure to the stock market 
would be present (yet minimal), the stock market’s historical real rate of return is almost 10% 
annually. This renders equity as an essential component of any investment strategy. Across all 
                                                 
9 Created by President Barack Obama, and was charged with proposing fiscally responsible solutions for reducing 
the Federal Deficit 
10 The third proposal also called for the possibility of contributing up to 2.5% of taxable wages to the accounts  
plans in Chile, the vast majority of contributions have been invested in public and corporate 
debt. This is much safer and less risky than equity, since rates are largely fixed and bondholders 
have the first claim on assets if an investment turns south. It is important to note that private 
IRA-like accounts would be much safer than throwing money at private equity and hedge funds, 
which public retirement systems have done for quite some time (and discovered that, contrary 
to prior belief, doesn’t guarantee higher returns for a given portfolio). This is, in large part, due 
to high administrative fees and poor performance of such funds, relative to mutual funds and 
index-tracking investments. Journalists such as Matt Taibbi of Rolling Stone have pointed this 
out in their investigative pieces (Taibbi, 2013). Of course, public employee pension reform is a 
different issue in itself to tackle, but it is almost certain that volatile hedge funds and private 
equity would be extremely limited in any IRA-type proposal. Even with such a small percentage 
of the Commission’s recommendations going towards “Wall Street” (1-4% of FICA taxes, 
followed by less than half of that to investments in equity), it has been rendered a non-starter 
in today’s political climate. This is unfortunate, because the Commission also sought to reform 
the program by reducing the inequalities found in today’s Social Security system. By raising the 
taxable income limit to $200,00011, due to the fact that wages above the tax limit are rising 
faster than the average American’s wage, the redistributive impact of the program could be 
restored. But can the redistributive aspect of the program remain, while switching to a private 
system? It is certainly possible. A minimum guaranteed pension, like the one installed in Chile 
(recently reformed to expand coverage), would be helpful in guaranteeing an appropriate 
standard of living for the poorest, while retaining property rights for AFP contributors. Of 
                                                 
11 Chile has no such taxable limit. 
course, what has happened in Latin American and Eastern Europe isn’t a cookie-cutter fit for 
the United States. Due to obvious age differences between reform countries, political obstacles, 
and a mature growth rate- privatization efforts should be carefully designed by policymakers 
with equity in mind. Taken with a long-term approach, while making a minimal impact on 
today’s contributors and retirees, privatization should be studied extensively in any retirement 
reform efforts undertaken.  
 General Augusto Pinochet was a repressive dictator who imposed much violence and 
economic hardship on the country during his sixteen year rule. Free-market policies and 
institutions that were enacted during his time in power, though, were highly successful in 
cutting extreme poverty and attracting capital to the country. An overhaul of Chile’s ineffective 
pension system is one of these successes, and the “Chilean Model” has been studied and 
implemented by many other countries across the globe. Many variations of liberalized pension 
systems have been developed- from the fully privatized systems prevalent in Latin America, to 
the mixed systems found in Central and Eastern Europe. The high returns of these systems 
largely coincided with strong economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s in non-industrialized 
countries. For developed countries with mature growth rates, like the United States, a private 
pension system retains the potential to outpace state-sponsored plans, while ensuring property 
rights and an equal field for all system participants. With structural reforms to both the 
economy and the Chilean AFPs, the integrity of the privatized system can remain intact. 
Furthermore, their system can continue to serve as a model for retirement reform in developed 
countries, like the United States- as policymakers begin to address future liabilities and deficits. 
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